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NOTES AND COMMENTS
As the matter now stands, courts seem too concerned with abso-
lutes. Both opinions in the Green case arrived at "total" resolutions
of the question of liability-each diametrically opposed to the other.
Neither recognized that, if all parties are to be justly treated, the
situation is one which demands compromise. It is submitted that the
best solution lies in judicial acceptance of the logic implicit in Wil-
liston's statement regarding the award of consequential damages."
For out-of-pocket expenses occasioned by use of a product, un-
merchantable due to some common class defect, the courts should
allow virtually automatic recovery. The question of damages be-
yond this amount, however, should be treated as a matter for sep-
arate consideration. So treated, this recovery should either be denied
outright, or at the very least be deemed subject to a counter-attack
by the manufacturer utilizing the classic tort defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk.4
HENRY S. MANNING, JR.
Torts-Employer's Duty to Infant Independent Contractor
In a recent Pennsylvania case,' the administratrix of the estate
of a deceased thirteen year old boy brought a wrongful death and
survival action against the boy's employer, a newspaper publisher.
The administratrix charged that the defendant was negligent in
"that it permitted and caused him to travel a dangerous route in
close proximity to a busy highway with a newspaper bag over his
shoulders containing approximately 75 newspapers .... ." In an
effort to avoid the effect of the workmen's compensation statute it
was alleged that the deceased had been employed as an independent
contractor. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief. It contended that
the characterization of deceased as an independent contractor was an
admission that defedant had no control over the means by which the
deceased accomplished his work and therefore it owed him no duty.
However, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
• See note 33 supra.
"See cases cited note 24 supra. See also 36 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 490 (1963)
(reaching essentially the same conclusion).
'Swartz v. Eberly, 212 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
2 Id. at 33.
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of 'Pennsylvania held that the duty owed the infant independent con-
tractor is the same as that owed an infant employee and that a claim
for relief was stated.
3
In passing on the motion to dismiss the court was faced with the
problem of determining the extent of the duty owed an independent
contractor by his employer rather than the more familiar problem
of the duty owed an employee.4
It is generally accepted that control is the basis for distinguishing
between employees and independent contractors.' If the employer
has the right to control the means of performing the contract the
worker is an employee.6 On the other hand, if his right to control
is limited to requiring certain definite results pursuant to the contract
then the worker is an independent contractor.7 The reduced degree
of control the employer may exercise in the case of the independent
aId. at 35.
'The employer of employees owes a duty to exercise due care to provide
a reasonably safe place to work. E.g., Cooley v. Walther, 226 Ark. 612, 291
S.W.2d 515 (1956); Sneed v. Lidman, 342 Mass. 228, 172 N.E.2d 836
(1961); Baumgartner v. Holslin, 236 Minn. 325, 52 N.W.2d 763 (1952);
Riggs. v. Empire Mfg. Co., 190 N.C. 256, 129 S.W. 595 (1925).
He must also exercise due care to provide the employee with reasonably
safe appliances. E.g., Lewis v. Curran, 17 Cal. App. 2d 689, 62 P.2d 800
(1936) ; Cherry v. Hawkins, 243 Miss. 392, 137 So. 2d 815 (1962) ; Holt v.
Oval Oak Mfg. Co., 177 N.C. 170, 98 S.E. 369 (1919).
The employer of an infant employee owes a further duty to warn and
instruct the infant of any dangers he might encounter in his work but which
because of his age and intelligence he would not appreciate. E.g., Combs v.
W. P. Sullivan & Co., 272 Ky. 522, 114 S.W.2d 754 (1958); Jenkins v.
Jenkins, 220 Minn. 216, 19 N.W.2d 389 (1945) ; McLaughlin v. Black, 215
N.C. 85, 1 S.E.2d 130 (1939); Rummel v. Dilworth, Porter & Co., 131 Pa.
509, 19 Atl. 345 (1890).
'E.g., MacMillan v. Montecito Country Club, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 240
(S.D. Cal. 1946); Turner v. Lewis, 282 S.W.2d 624 (Ky. 1955); Cooper v.
Asheville Citizen Times Publishing Co., 258 N.C. 578, 129 S.E.2d 107
(1963); Tennessee Valley Appliances, Inc. v. Rowden, 24 Tenn. App. 487,
146 S.W.2d 845 (1940). See generally Steffen, Independent Contractor and
the Good Life, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 501 (1935); 25 MAIQ. L. REv. 109 (1941).
a E.g., MacMillan v. Montecito Country Club, Inc., 65 F. Suipp. 240 (S.D.
Cal. 1946) ; Jack & Jill, Inc. v. Tone, 126 Conn. 114, 9 A.2d 497 (1939) ;
Pearson v. Peerless Flooring Co., 247 N.C. 434, 101 S.E.2d 301 (1958);
Feller v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 363 Pa. 483, 70 A.2d 299 (1950).
MECiEm, AGENCY § 13 (4th ed. 1952); REsTATEmENT (SEcoND), AGENCY
§§ 2(2), 220 (1958).
E.g., Cawthon v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 124 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1960); Allen v. Kraft Food Co., 118 Ind. App. 467, 76 N.E.2d 845
(1948); Income Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 168 Tenn. 471, 79 S.W.2d 572
(1935). MECHaEm, AGENCY § 14 (4th ed. 1952); RESTATEmENT (SECOND),
AGENCY § 2(3) (1958). See generally MECHEm, AGENCY §§ 427-31 (4th ed.
1952); Annot., 19 A.L.R. 226 (1922).
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contractor has led courts to immunize employers from liability to a
third party who is injured by the independent contractor in the
course of his work.s It is this same difference in the extent of con-
trol that has served as a basis for the idea that the employer of an
independent contractor owes him no duty while the independent con-
tractor is performing the contract.9 Despite the existence of this idea
courts have recognized a duty to independent contractors ° but at
the same time have clung to the idea that a difference in the extent
8 Batt v. San Diego Sun Pub. Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 429, 69 P.2d 216
(1937); Morris v. Constitution Publishing Co., 84 Ga. App. 816, 67 S.E.2d
407 (1951); Brownrigg v. Allvine Dairy Co., 137 Kan. 209, 19 P.2d 474
(1933); Skidmore v. Haggard, 341 Mo. 837, 110 S.W.2d 726 (1937).
'E.g., Arizona Binghamton Copper Co. v. Dickson, 22 Ariz. 163, 195
Pac. 538 (1921). "The general rule is that a contractor cannot recover dam-
ages from his employer for injuries he may sustain in the performance of his
contract, and it is predicated upon the fact that the contractor has control and
is bound, as every principal is to provide for his own safety and protec-
tion." Id. at 170, 195 Pac. at 540.
10 Dingman v. A. F. Mattock Co., 15 Cal. 2d 622, 104 P.2d 26 (1940);
Reardon v. Exchange Furniture Store, Inc., 37 Del. 321, 183 Atl. 330 (1936) ;
Hall v. Holland, 47 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1950); Gowing v. Henry Field Co., 225
Iowa 729, 281 N.W. 281 (1938) ; Edwards v. Johnson, 306 S.W.2d 845 (Ky.
1957); Resnikoff v. Friedman, 124 Minn. 343, 144 N.W. 1095 (1914); Mc-
Laughlin v. Creamery Package & Mfg. Co., 130 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. Ct. App.
1939); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Barnes, 198 Okla. 406, 179 P.2d 132
(1946) ; Stepp v. Renn, 184 Pa. Super. 634, 135 A.2d 794 (1957).
In dictum in Deaton v. Board of Trustees, 226 N.C. 433, 38 S.E.2d 561
(1946), the North Carolina Supreme Court stated the employer's liability as
follows: "[I]t is generally held that one who is having work done on his
premises by an independent contractor is under the obligation to exercise
ordinary care to furnish reasonable protection against the consequence of
hidden dangers known, or which ought to be known, to the proprietor and
not to the contractor or his servants." Id. at 438, 38 S.E.2d at 564. This
was recognized as the law of North Carolina in Brooks v. United States, 194
F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1952).
In Henry v. White, 259 N.C. 282, 130 S.E.2d 412 (1963), the deceased,
an electrician, was killed on defendant's premises while attempting to repair
refrigeration machinery which he had installed earlier. Finding the deceased
an independent contractor, the court stated: "The duty imposed on an em-
ployer to exercise care to provide a reasonably safe place for his employees
to work... does not extend to non-employee "trouble-shooters," specialists
in their field who respond to owner's call to service and repair a machine....
The owner must warn of hidden dangers known to the owner but unknown
to the other." Id. at 284, 130 S.E.2d at 413.
This case was decided on the ground that deceased assumed the risk of a
danger which he was in a better position to assess than the owner, rather
than on the ground of a particular relationship between the deceased and the
owner. Nevertheless, it further illustrates that North Carolina requires a
less rigid standard of employers of independent contractors than of those
engaging employees.
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of control should result in a difference in the duties owed to the two
classes."
The principal case is a departure from this idea. 2 It not only
holds there is a duty owed the infant independent contractor but
bases it on the duty owed an infant employee in Pennsylvania. That
duty is to warn and instruct the infant of any dangers he might en-
counter in his work but which because of his age and intelligence
he would not appreciate. 13 This writer believes the decision of the
court was correct. The duty to warn and instruct, to be effective,
must be performed prior to commencement of the work. Thus, con-
trol of the means of performing the work is not a prerequisite to the
effective performance of such duty and should not be grounds for
lessening the duty owed an infant because he is employed as an inde-
pendent contractor rather than an employee.
The soundness of the principal case, which subjects the em-
ployer to the same liability in certain instances whether he utilizes
an independent contractor or an employee, should be recognized by
those employers such as newspaper publishers, who have tradition-
ally employed infants. The characterization of the worker as an inde-
pendent contractor may continue to prevent liability from being im-
puted to the employer in tort situations involving third parties' 4 but
if the holding of the principal case is followed in other jurisdictions
such employers will find their liability for injuries suffered by the
infant independent contractor himself greater than if the same party
had come under workmen's compensation.
MARVIN E. TAYLOR, JR.
' Cases cited note 10 supra.
12 In Missouri the employer owes an independent contractor working on
his premises the same duty he owes an invitee. Stein v. Battenfeld Oil &
Grease Co., 327 Mo. 804, 39 S.W.2d 345 (1931). In an earlier case, Cum-
mings v. Union Quarry & Constr. Co., 231 Mo. App. 1224, 87 S.W.2d 1039
(1935), it was held that the duty owed an independent contractor was sub-
stantially the same owed an employee where the employer furnished and
retained control of the premises. Roach v. Herz-Oakes Candy Co., 357 Mo.
1236, 212 S.W.2d 758 (1948), reiterated the requirement that the employer
furnish and retain control before the same duty could be imposed. The facts
indicate the premises were furnished in all three cases. This leaves control
as the real distinguishing factor.
" Fisher v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 153 Pa. 379, 26 At. 18
(1893) ; Rummel v. Dilworth, Porter & Co., 131 Pa. 509, 19 At. 345 (1890)."' Cases cited note 8 supra.
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